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Abstract 
 
Given that eyewitness evidence is one of the most influential forms of courtroom evidence, 
and that eyewitness errors are a major contributor to wrongful conviction, it is paramount that 
investigators collect evidence from witnesses in a way that preserves accuracy. The best way 
to do this is to prioritise open questions (e.g., “what did you see?”) over closed questions 
(e.g., “did the man hit the woman?”). Yet despite comprehensive interview training 
protocols, police investigators continue to ask an inappropriately high number of closed 
questions during their interviews. We used a question generation paradigm to examine the 
ease with which lay participants generated open versus closed questions, and the role of prior 
knowledge on their performance. Participants (N = 287) were given two minutes to generate 
either open or closed questions for a hypothetical witness to an assault. Half of the 
participants were first provided with information about the crime—ostensibly from other 
witnesses. We expected that participants asked to generate open questions would generate 
fewer questions and make more errors than those asked to generate closed questions, and that 
exposure to prior information would make it harder to generate open—but not closed—
questions. We also expected that participants provided with prior information would show 
evidence of using that information when asking closed questions. Each of these hypotheses 
was supported, suggesting that confirmation bias could play a role in question generation 
difficulty. These findings have important implications for the development of police 
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Eyewitness evidence plays a critical role in the apprehension, prosecution, and 
adjudication of criminal offenders (Cutler & Penrod, 1995). While physical evidence (e.g., a 
fingerprint) can link a suspect to a crime scene, eyewitness evidence often links a suspect 
directly to the crime. For this reason, eyewitness evidence is particularly persuasive to fact-
finders (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). People consider eyewitness evidence to be reliable even 
when it contains major inconsistencies (Brewer & Burke, 2002), or is accompanied by 
alternative conflicting evidence (Maeder, Ewanation, & Monnink, 2017; Pozzulo, Lemieux, 
Wilson, Crescini, & Girardi, 2009; Wells, 1992). Given these findings, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that an estimated 77,000 US residents each year become defendants solely on 
the basis of testimony from a witness (Wells et al., 1998). 
 Unfortunately, eyewitness evidence is not only persuasive, it is also highly fallible. In 
fact, eyewitness error is the leading contributor to miscarriages of justice. Over three-quarters 
(76%) of wrongful convictions identified by the The Innocence Project—a non-profit 
organisation using DNA evidence to exonerate innocent people convicted of a crime—
involved mistaken eyewitnesses (Innocence Project, 2017). One exoneration case involved 
five different eyewitnesses, all of whom were mistaken (Dwyer, Neufeld, & Scheck, 2000). 
Eyewitness Memory  
Why do these kinds of errors occur? The simple answer is that memory is not the 
recording device that many believe it to be (Simons & Chabris, 2011). Decades of eyewitness 
memory research have challenged the original trace theory of memory, which proposed that 
memories were simply neural traces of the original experience (Gomulicki, 1953). We now 
know that rather than being a fixed and unchangeable entity, memory is a reconstructive 
process (Lacy & Stark, 2013; Wagoner, 2017). This reconstruction occurs so that our 
memory fits our understanding of an event. As our understanding develops with the addition 
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of new information, this information can be integrated and the memory developed in line 
with the new thoughts (Bartlett, 1931).  
For this reason, memory is remarkably malleable. It has been repeatedly demonstrated 
in the literature that witnesses will change their recollection to fit with information provided 
after the event, regardless of the accuracy of that information (Loftus, 2005; Morgan, 
Southwick, Steffian, Hazlett, & Loftus, 2013). This impairment of memory for past events 
following exposure to incorrect information—or misinformation—is known as the 
misinformation effect (Loftus, 2005). A lack of introspective awareness means individuals 
can fail to register that post-event influences have altered their thinking and fail to notice that 
their memory has been affected (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
The misinformation effect is thought to occur due to errors in source monitoring—that 
is, the failure to correctly identify the source of a memory (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993). A witness to a bank robbery might report seeing the offender drive off in a red car, for 
example, when in actual fact they read this detail in the newspaper. The source monitoring 
framework (Johnson et al., 1993) suggests that the cognitive processes responsible for 
attributing thoughts and images to a particular source involve only the content or 
characteristics of the event in question, as opposed to being directly specified by distinct 
abstract labels. Because post-event information often bears similar characteristics to genuine 
memories, it is easy for people to inaccurately attribute the source of post-event information 
to the event itself (Lindsay, 2008). Our inability to identify the source of information means 
that we are likely poor judges of our own accuracy, and even the most well-intentioned 
witness may unconsciously recount distorted recollections (Leippe, 1980; Morgan et al., 
2013; Yuille, 1980). 
Post-event influences are both common and wide-ranging. Some sources of 
misinformation are internal. For example, expectations held by an individual about how an 
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event generally unfolds, or schemas, can influence the type of details they encode and retain. 
This phenomenon was demonstrated by Tuckey and Brewer (2003), who found that 
information from a criminal event that is not essential to an individual’s crime schema (e.g., 
the particular escape route employed) tends to fade more readily with time than schema-
relevant information. Moreover, ambiguous information—such as the offender holding their 
hand in their jacket pocket—tends to be interpreted in line with crime schemas (i.e., the 
concealment of a gun). This inferential reasoning can also distort a memory over time, 
introducing more schema-consistent inaccuracies. In the example given above, for example, 
the individual might incorrectly remember seeing the offender holding a gun (Tuckey & 
Brewer, 2003).  
Imagination can also serve as a powerful post-event influence. It has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that imagining an event can increase our confidence that the event occurred—a 
phenomenon referred to as imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 
1996). In addition to increasing confidence, imagining a fictitious event can induce entirely 
false memories (Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Sharman, Garry, & Hunt, 2005). In fact, simply 
hearing others discuss their experience, then imagining that experience, can convince people 
that they were there (Pynoos & Nader, 1989). These types of effects increase with repeated 
imagining (Thomas & Loftus, 2002).  
Misinformation can also be introduced externally, through a variety of sources. These 
sources include the media (e.g., Crombag, Wagenaar, & van Koppen, 1996) and 
conversations with others who saw the same event (e.g., Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey, & 
Lenton, 2008). Most pertinent to the criminal investigation process, however, is the finding 
that the way a witness is interviewed can exert a powerful influence on what they report, and 
even what they remember (Wright, Nash, & Wade, 2015).   
The effects of misinformation introduced through questions posed to witnesses was 
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first examined by Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues in the 1970s. These researchers 
demonstrated that even slight differences in the wording of an investigative question could 
influence eyewitness recall. Loftus (1975), for example, showed participants a film depicting 
a car accident and immediately afterward asked them a series of questions. Half of the 
participants were asked, “did you see a broken headlight?” while the other half were asked, 
“did you see the broken headlight?” Participants in the latter condition were significantly 
more likely to answer in the affirmative (i.e., to say yes). The tendency for misinformation to 
be incorporated into the original event memory was first demonstrated by Loftus, Miller, and 
Burns (1978), who showed participants images of a car stopping at a stop sign before 
eventually hitting a pedestrian. During later questioning, half of the participants had 
misleading information introduced when asked, “did the car stop at the yield sign?” When 
later asked what they had seen, participants in the yield-sign condition had difficulty 
discriminating between the sign they had actually seen and the sign that they had been told 
about. In fact, over 50% of participants in that condition incorrectly reported having seen a 
yield sign in the images.  
 Research has repeatedly demonstrated that misinformation introduced within 
interview questions can add false details to witnesses’ accounts, as well as change details that 
were originally accurately encoded (Belli, 1989; Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Loftus, 1979; 
Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989; Manning & Loftus, 1996; Okado & Stark, 
2005; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989; Wagenaar & Boer, 1987; for a review, see Loftus 2005). 
Participants have even been led to “remember” entire events that did not happen (Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995). For example, across three interviews Porter, Yuille, and Lehman (1999) 
attempted to implant a false memory of a stressful, but fictional, childhood event (an animal 
attack). By the end of the third interview, 26% of participants exhibited a comprehensive 
false memory and a further 40% reported at least some aspects of the false event.  
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 We also know from the empirical literature that numerous factors make memories 
particularly susceptible to distortion. For example, being under the influence of alcohol 
(Mintzer, 2007) or drugs (Parrott & Lasky, 1998) negatively affects memory, and even the 
suggestion of alcohol consumption can increase vulnerability to the misinformation effect 
(Assefi & Garry, 2003). Other environmental factors that can increase susceptibility to 
misinformation include the presence of a weapon (Saunders, 2008) and having another 
person corroborate the event (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Memories of stressful events 
(Morgan et al., 2013) and highly emotional events (Nourkova, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2004) are 
also particularly susceptible to modification, as are memories for more distant events 
(Paterson, Kemp, & Forgas, 2009). Unfortunately, the events about which police 
investigators interview witnesses frequently include a combination of these factors.  
Questioning Witnesses  
The deleterious effects of poor interviewing are irreversible; they cannot be rectified 
by procedures performed correctly later on (Wise, Dauphinais, & Safer, 2007; Wogalter, 
Malpass, & McQuiston, 2004). For this reason, it is crucial that the contamination of 
eyewitness memory is actively prevented throughout the interview process. Fortunately, 
decades of memory research has firmly established the conditions under which witnesses 
should be questioned to elicit accurate evidence.  
To avoid unduly shaping a witness’s memory, it is important that investigators phrase 
their questions so these do not contain any indication of how the event unfolded (Poole & 
Lamb, 1998; Powell, Fisher, & Wright, 2005; Powell & Snow, 2007). Consequently, it is 
widely acknowledged that interviews should begin with a free recall phase, or narrative 
account (e.g., “tell me everything that happened during the bank robbery”). Here, the witness 
recounts any aspects of the event that they choose, at their own pace, without interruption, 
and using their own words (Oxburgh, Myklebust, & Grant, 2010; Powell & Snow, 2007).  
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But although this narrative phase tends to elicit highly accurate information (Lindberg 
et al., 2003), witnesses’ free recall accounts rarely provide all of the information required by 
the interviewer (Myklebust & Bjørklund, 2006). Police investigators require witnesses to 
describe events in more detail than one would normally provide in a day-to-day interaction, 
and witnesses are often unaware of the information that is crucial to the investigation (Fisher 
& Schreiber 2017). Consequently, investigators frequently need to ask for more detail. Open 
questions (e.g., “what was he wearing?”), which require multiple-word responses as opposed 
to a simple yes or no (Fisher, 1995; Oxburgh et al., 2010; Rapley, 2001), are recommended 
for this purpose. Open questions still provide the witness with the flexibility to choose which 
aspects of an event they report based on their memory for what happened. They also place 
less pressure for an immediate answer, providing the witness with time to collect their 
thoughts, and therefore promoting elaborate memory retrieval (Wright & Powell, 2005). 
Sternberg et al. (1996) found that when interviewers asked open questions, responses were 
four times longer and three times richer in relevant detail than responses elicited via more 
restrictive questions.   
When questions restrict the witness’s range of responses (e.g., “did that happen 
during the daytime or the nighttime?” or “did he have a gun?”), the chances of error increase 
(Pipe et al., 2004; Ibabe & Sporer, 2004; Lipton, 1977). In fact, the more specific questions 
become, the more likely a witness is to report incorrect information (Lipton, 1977). This 
happens because closed questions direct an individual’s attention away from searching 
through memories internally to focusing externally on the information inherent in the 
interviewer’s question (Powell, Fisher, & Wright, 2005). As a result, the witness might 
falsely recognise the details provided within the question, or exhibit a response bias in which 
they acquiesce with the interviewer without reflection (Roberts & Powell, 2001).  
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Police Interview Protocols 
When the research findings discussed above came to light, researchers began to 
examine police interviewing practice to assess how well it aligned with these basic 
questioning principles. The results of this research were concerning. During the 1980s, for 
example, Fisher, Geiselman, and Raymond (1987) critically analysed police interviewing 
techniques from interviews conducted during a one-year period, noting that there was little 
structure across the interviews and that police were making avoidable, systematic errors that 
limited the amount of information elicited. Too few open questions were asked, while far too 
many questions—in fact, 90% of follow up questions in this study—were closed. Questions 
were asked in an inflexible and apparently pre-determined order, and police frequently 
interrupted eyewitnesses; the average length of uninterrupted free recall was a mere 7.5 
seconds (Fisher et al., 1987). Other studies conducted across the same general time period 
reported similar findings (Baldwin, 1993; Irving & Hilgendorf, 1980; McConville & 
Baldwin, 1982) 
To address these types of problems, evidence-based interview training for police 
investigators has now been implemented around the world, including in the UK, Israel, 
Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand (Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). Although the 
interview protocols employed vary slightly across jurisdiction, they all converge on several 
key features of a ‘good’ interview: establishing rapport, encouraging the witness to volunteer 
information without prompting, asking open questions, not interrupting, avoiding leading 
questions, and cautioning the witness not to guess (Powell, Fisher, & Wright, 2005; 
Sternberg, Lamb, Davies, & Westcott, 2001; Wells et al., 2000). 
Yet although interviewing protocols have become widely established, the data relating 
to protocol adherence are concerning. Sternberg, Lamb, Davies, and Westcott (2001), for 
example, evaluated the quality of investigative interviewing in the UK following the 
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implementation of an evidence-based interview guide. The researchers found that the 
interviewers rarely used open questions to elicit information, instead, relying heavily on 
highly suggestive closed questions (e.g., “did he do anything with his hands?”). In fact, 
almost 40% of the information that witnesses provided was elicited via suggestive questions. 
Similarly, Wise, Safer, and Maro (2011) compared law enforcement officers from 
departments in the US that had implemented eyewitness reforms with those from departments 
that had not. Both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness factors and reported 
conducting interviews in a way that violated many of the principles of best-practice. In fact, 
there were no differences, in knowledge or interviewing practice, between the officers from 
reform departments and non-reform departments (Wise et al., 2011). Together, these findings 
demonstrate that evidence-based interview training may not have as large an effect on 
investigators’ practice as anticipated.   
Even when training leads to an increase in interviewers’ knowledge, there is no 
guarantee of improved practice. Warren et al. (1999) assessed experienced interviewers 
before and after they attended a 10-day investigative interviewing training institute. While 
interviewers’ knowledge of the scientific basis behind interview protocols significantly 
increased following their training, there was no change in the way they questioned witnesses, 
or in the amount of accurate information that they elicited during the mock interviews. Less 
than 25% of information reported was elicited via open questions or free recall prompts; the 
recommended percentage is three times this amount (Wilson & Powell, 2001).  
Taken together, these research findings indicate that while police investigators can be 
taught best-practice eyewitness interviewing principles, successfully converting those 
principles to practice presents a considerable challenge (Warren et al., 1999). Wise and 
colleagues (2011) stressed that the focus of research needs to be on effectively persuading 
police officers to implement the necessary techniques outlined in the evidence-base. To do 
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this, however, we first need to understand why police investigators appear to experience such 
difficulty adhering to best practice.  
Why is ‘Good Interviewing’ so Difficult?  
Police investigators commonly report that it is simply “harder” to ask open questions. 
There are two main ways to account for this difficulty, and these are not mutually exclusive 
(Wright and Powell, 2006). The first is that investigators are simply not accustomed to asking 
open questions. Everyday conversations in English-speaking countries commonly consist of a 
relatively closed style of questioning (Eades, 1996). It has also been repeatedly demonstrated 
that police officers with greater experience (Lafontaine & Cyr, 2016; O’Brien, Westera, & 
Zajac, 2019; Powell, Hughes-Scholes, Smith, & Sharman, 2014), particularly in using closed 
questions (Wright & Powell, 2006), struggle more with learning to ask open questions. In 
other words, old habits can get in the way of new ones—a phenomenon referred to as 
proactive interference (Hay & Jacoby, 1996).  
 The second potential reason investigators have difficulty asking open questions is that 
no investigator comes into an interview “blind.”  That is, when interviewers sit down to 
question a witness, it is likely that they already have some information about what happened. 
This information might come from what they observed when they arrived on the scene, from 
other witnesses interviewed previously, or from other aspects of the investigation (e.g., 
medical findings or other physical evidence). Furthermore, even in cases where the 
investigator does not hold this information, they are likely to have a sound knowledge of the 
specific details required to press charges and, more specifically, to decide which particular 
charges apply.  
If an investigator has a preconceived notion of how an event unfolded, or the specific 
nature of the details they require, then it stands to reason that they will find it more 
challenging to refrain from incorporating those details into their questions. How might these 
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findings translate to interviews conducted with witnesses? We propose that if an interviewer 
knows the specific nature of the details they require, they will find it easier to frame their 
questions in a closed manner. If the interviewer wants to know whether the offender was 
wearing a disguise, for example, it should require less cognitive effort to generate the 
question, “was he wearing a disguise?” than to generate an open question that elicits the 
same information (e.g., “describe what he was wearing”). There is also an underlying 
assumption among police investigators that to elicit specific information, one must ask a 
specific question (Wright & Powell, 2006).  
We also propose that holding prior information about how the crime unfolded should 
amplify this effect. The basis for this hypothesis comes from the phenomenon of 
confirmation bias—the tendency to seek, perceive, interpret, and remember new evidence in 
ways that verify pre-existing beliefs and expectations (Nickerson, 1998). Confirmation bias is 
seen across a range of everyday interactions (Snyder & Swann, 1978) and disciplines 
(Nickerson, 1998). Within the field of police investigation, confirmation bias has been 
identified as a major issue (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; NAS, 2009). Investigators rarely 
seek evidence from witnesses that will disconfirm their hypothesis (Toglia, Read, Ross, & 
Lindsay, 2007). People who are testing a hypothesis tend to ask hypothesis-consistent 
questions, which commonly elicit hypothesis-consistent answers, therefore, strengthening the 
bias (Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, & Miyake, 1995).  
 Confirmation bias in a police interviewer can be dangerous, as it can lead to the 
contamination of evidence. Research has demonstrated that when an interview is conducted 
by an interviewer who harbours preconceived notions of what happened, there is an increased 
likelihood of false evidence from the witness (Quas et al., 2007). Moreover, these distortions 
can persist throughout subsequent, non-biased, interviews (Thompson, Clarke-Stewart, & 
Lepore, 1997).  
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How does confirmation bias increase the likelihood of false evidence? Existing 
research on interviews with suspects suggests that confirmation bias can have a strong 
influence on the questions that an investigator asks, which in turn influences the 
interviewee’s responses. For example, Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky (2003) asked 
investigators to interrogate the suspects in a mock theft. Investigators were either led to 
believe that the suspect was guilty or innocent. Before the interview, participants selected six 
interview questions they wanted to ask from a list comprised of question pairs, one being 
neutral (e.g., “did you know anything about the key that was hidden behind the VCR?”) and 
the other guilt-presumptive (e.g., “how did you know about the key that was hidden behind 
the VCR?”). Participants harbouring guilty expectations chose more guilt-presumptive 
questions, exerted more pressure on the suspect to confess, and were more likely to judge the 
suspect as guilty at the end of the interview. Alarmingly, these behaviours all increased when 
interviewing innocent suspects. (see Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008, for similar findings). 
The Present Study  
 In the present study, we extend the current literature by focusing on the influence of 
question type and prior information on laypeople’s ability to generate interview questions. 
Participants in the study were asked to generate either open or closed questions for a 
hypothetical witness to a crime. We also manipulated what participants were told about the 
crime—half of the participants were given information that set an expectation of what the 
witness saw, while the remaining participants did not receive this information.  
We measured the number of questions that each participant formulated in a 2-minute 
timeframe, as well as the number of errors (i.e., closed questions when the participant was 
asked to generate open questions, or vice versa). We predicted that participants would 
generate fewer open questions within the two-minute timeframe than closed questions. 
Similarly, we predicted that participants asked to generate open questions in the 2-minute 
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time frame would show a greater number of errors than those asked to generate closed 
questions. We also expected that prior information would make it harder for participants to 
generate open—but not closed—questions.  
We also studied how prior information might influence the content of the closed 
questions that were correctly—and incorrectly—generated. We predicted that participants in 
the informed condition would be more likely than naïve participants to ask closed questions 
about topics contained in the prior information. Furthermore, we predicted that participants in 
the context condition would be more likely than naïve participants to generate their questions 




Ethical Approval  
Category B ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of Otago 
Human Ethics Committee (approval number DP16/284). 
Participants 
We recruited 307 participants (Mage = 21.15 years, SDage = 3.32, age range = 17 to 42 
years, 239 females) for this study. This sample size gave us at least 95% power to detect a 
‘medium-sized’ effect for the comparisons of interest (d = 0.50; see Cohen, 1988). 
Participants were either recruited from the Year 1 and 2 University of Otago Psychology 
Participation Pool, or from the Psychology Department Paid Research Participation website. 
Students recruited from the participant pool had the opportunity to earn a small amount of 
course credit by completing a questionnaire based on the experiment. Members of the 
Dunedin community who were recruited from the website received $15 to reimburse them for 
the costs of participating.  
Design  
OPEN AND CLOSED QUESTION GENERATION 14 
 We employed a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The first factor, question type, related 
to whether participants were asked to generate open questions or closed questions. The 
second factor, context, related to whether or not participants were provided with context 
about the crime. Participants were quasi-randomly assigned to each of these between-subjects 
conditions, such that there were approximately equal numbers of participants in each of the 
four cells.     
Experimental Procedure 
Participants all took part in the experiment individually. On arrival at the laboratory, 
they were greeted and led to a private interview room containing a computer. Participants 
completed informed consent procedures before the experimental procedure began. This 
process involved the participant reading an information sheet regarding the experiment and 
signing a consent form, after being provided with the opportunity to ask any questions of the 
experimenter. The procedure began with a training session conducted via computer. The 
examiner introduced this by saying: 
 
“This part of the experiment will take under 15 minutes. First, I’m going to 
get you to read some information about question types and answer some 
questions on the computer. When you’re finished, it well tell you to come 
and get me..”  
 
The experimenter then left the room while the participant moved through the presentation at 
their own pace. Participants were taught about closed and open questions, and how they 
differ. They were then presented with a series of 20 questions and asked to identify whether 
each was open or closed. They were given feedback as to the accuracy of their responses. 
These data were not included in our data analysis.  
Following the completion of the training session, the experimenter returned to the 
room and said:  
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Now I’m going to get you to do a task based on what you’ve just learned. 
You are to imagine you’re a police officer. This is James, a student at the 
university [A photo of “James” appeared on the computer screen]. James 
has just witnessed a physical altercation between a male and a female on 
campus. You need to interview James to find out what he saw.  
 
Participants were then given two minutes to generate questions out loud. 
Approximately half of the participants (n = 153) were asked to generate open questions, 
while the remaining participants (n = 154) were asked to generate closed questions. The 
experimenter said:   
 
You’re going to use your knowledge of open and closed questions to conduct 
the interview. The “catch” is that we are going to limit you to one type of 
question. So, all of the questions that you ask James have to be 
[CLOSED/OPEN] questions.  
 
Of course, James is not going to answer you. So, once you ask a question, 
continue to ask the next question as fast as you can. Ask as many 
[CLOSED/OPEN] questions as you can before I tell you to stop. If you 
accidentally ask an [OPEN/CLOSED] question, don’t worry, just continue. 
Ok, do you understand what you have to do? Do you have any questions 
before we begin? Because once you start the task you can’t ask me for 
further clarification.  
 
You are to ask James [CLOSED/OPEN] questions about what he saw. 
Remember to keep generating questions until I say stop.  
 
Within each of these conditions, approximately half of the participants were also 
given additional information about the alleged crime (informed condition; n = 146). 
Specifically, these participants were told that three other witnesses had already provided the 
following information about the altercation:   
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 The pair seemed to know each other. The altercation started after the male 
dropped a cell phone on the ground. Both parties started yelling at each 
other. The female tried to get the cell phone but the male pushed her away. 
The male then hit the female. The male yelled “I’ll fucking hurt you.” Then 
both parties hit each other and wrestled over the phone. The physical 
altercation ended when the female fell to the ground and began crying. 
The male then threw the phone on the ground and stormed away. One of 
the witnesses went up to the female to ask if she was ok. The female said 
she was fine. She had a cut to her lip that was bleeding. 
 
 
This information was provided in written form, and participants were free to refer to it during 
the experimental task. The remaining participants were assigned to the naive condition (n = 
161); these participants were not provided with any prior information. 
The entire experimental procedure typically took between 10 and 20 minutes. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were thanked and fully debriefed, and the experimenter 
answered any questions that participants had about the experiment.  
Coding and Inter-Rater Reliability  
Participants’ responses to the question generation task were audio-recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. Any identifying information was removed from the data set prior to 
coding. We measured the total word count of the generated questions, to allow us to control 
for the possibility that questions of one type were simply longer than the other. We then 
coded two variables: 1) the number of questions of the required type (i.e., open or closed) 
generated within the 2-minute time frame; and 2) the number of errors (i.e., questions of the 
wrong type) generated within the 2-minute time frame. Two coders independently coded a 
sample of the transcripts. Agreement between coders was high, as measured by Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients of .96 for correct questions and .99 for errors. Disagreements were 
resolved through discussion, and the primary coder then coded the remaining transcripts.  
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Following this initial coding process, we examined the closed questions that 
participants generated ether correctly (for participants in the closed question condition) or 
incorrectly (for participants in the open question condition). This coding involved two stages. 
First, questions were coded according to their content; that is, whether or not the question 
related to the prior information provided to half of the participants—regardless of whether or 
not participants had been assigned to that condition. Next, those questions that were 
identified as containing content pertaining to the prior information were coded according to 
the nature of the question; that is, whether the question simply confirmed that prior 
information (e.g., “Did the female have a cut lip?”), or whether the question assumed the 
prior information to be fact and elaborated on it in their questioning (e.g., “Did the female 
have any other injuries besides the cut lip?”). Again, two coders independently coded a 
sample of the transcripts. Agreement between coders was high, as evidenced by Cohen’s 
kappa coefficients of .84 for question content, and .78 for question nature. Disagreements 




Data from 20 participants were excluded from our analyses for one of three reasons. 
First, some participants (n = 8) mistakenly believed that James was the male involved in the 
altercation, rather than the witness. Second, some participants’ responses indicated that they 
had not understood the task, or did not have adequate proficiency in English to complete the 
task (n = 4). Finally, data from 8 participants were excluded due to experimenter error (e.g., 
non-standardised instructions). The final sample for analysis comprised 287 participants (Mage 
= 21.11 years, SDage = 3.32, age range = 17 to 42 years, 221 females).   
Number of Questions Correctly Generated 
OPEN AND CLOSED QUESTION GENERATION 18 
First, we examined the number of questions that participants generated correctly 
during the 2-minute time frame. A planned independent-samples t-test collapsing across 
context revealed that participants in the open question condition correctly generated fewer 
questions than participants in the closed question condition, t(285) = 4.68, d = 0.55, p < .01. 
We then conducted separate planned t-tests on these data, comparing the naïve and informed 
conditions; we did this separately for the open and closed conditions (see Figure 1). As 
expected, prior information did not influence the number of closed questions generated (M = 
9.66, SE = .52 and M = 10.33, SE = .68, for informed and naïve conditions respectively), 
t(142) = .78, Cohen’s d = 0.13, p = .44, two-tailed. Participants in the informed condition 
generated fewer open questions (M = 6.97, SE = .40) than did participants in the naïve 
condition (M = 8.18, SE = .41), t(141) = 2.12, d = 0.36, p < .05, two-tailed. 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of questions correctly generated (±1SE), shown as a function of question 
type (open or closed) and context (naïve or informed). 
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In interpreting these findings, it was important to rule out the possibility that there were 
differences in the length of—and therefore the time taken to utter—open and closed questions. 
Although the mean length of each question was similar in the open condition (M = 8.35, SE = 
0.20) and closed condition (M = 8.28, SE = 0.20), t(283) = -0.24, d = 0.03, p = .81, two-tailed, 
we nonetheless re-ran our analyses with this variable as a covariate. Separate one-way 
ANOVAs for open and closed conditions controlling for mean question length revealed a 
significant effect of prior information on open question generation, F(1,139) = 5.33, p < .05, 
ƞ𝜌
²  = .04, but not closed question generation, F(1,140) = .01, p = .94, ƞ𝜌
²  = .00. 
Number of Errors  
Our next step was to examine the number of errors that participants made during the question 
generation task. An error occurred each time a participant in the open-question condition 
incorrectly generated a closed question, or a participant in the closed-question condition 
incorrectly generated an open question. These data are shown in Figure 2. A planned 
independent-samples t-test collapsing across context revealed that participants in the open 
question condition made more errors than participants in the closed question condition, t(285) 
= -2.12, d = 0.25, p < .01. Further planned t-tests revealed that prior information did not exert 
a significant effect on the number of errors made, regardless of question type condition (open 
questions, t(141) = 0.19, d = 0.38, p = .85, two-tailed; closed questions, t(142) = -0.67, d = 
0.11, p = .50, two-tailed). That is, participants in the open question condition made a similar 
number of errors when they were given prior information (M = 2.26, SE = 0.29) as they did 
when they were not (M = 2.34, SE = 0.28), and the same was true of participants in the closed 
question condition (informed condition M = 1.65, SE = 0.31; naïve condition (M = 1.38, SE = 
0.24).   
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Figure 2. Number of errors (±1SE), shown as a function of question type (open or closed) and 
context (naïve or informed). 
 
Question Content 
 Recall that we also examined the content of the closed questions that participants 
generated—either correctly (for participants in the closed question conditions) or incorrectly 
(for participants in the open question conditions). Specifically, we wanted to know whether the 
prior information was influencing question content. 
To answer this question, we first coded closed questions according to whether or not 
their content related to the prior information topics. Chi square analyses revealed that those in 
the prior information condition were more likely than those in the naïve condition to ask 
closed questions related to those topics—both correctly, χ2 (1, N = 1454) = 117.15, ϕ = 0.09, 
p < .01, and incorrectly, χ2 (1, N = 328) = 6.98, ϕ = 0.15, p < .01 (see Figures 3 and 4).  
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Figure 3. Percentage of correctly generated closed questions that contained prior information 




Figure 4. Percentage of incorrectly generated closed questions that contained prior information 
or novel information topics, shown as a function of context (naïve or informed). 
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We then conducted further coding on the closed questions that pertained to the prior 
information. Specifically, we coded these questions according to whether they were aimed at 
confirming the prior information (e.g., “Was her lip bleeding?”) or elaborating on it (e.g., “Did 
she have any other injuries besides the bleeding lip?”). Again, Chi square analyses revealed 
that, although participants in both prior information conditions were more likely to ask 
confirmatory questions than elaborative questions, informed participants were more likely than 
naïve participants to ask elaborative questions—both correctly, χ2 (1, N = 721) = 30.27, ϕ = 





Figure 5. Percentage of correctly generated closed questions about prior information topics 
that were elaborative or confirmatory, shown as a function of context (naïve or informed).  
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Figure 6. Percentage of incorrectly generated closed questions about prior information topics 
that were elaborative or confirmatory, shown as a function of context (naïve or informed).  
 
Discussion 
Despite a wealth of research showing that open questions (e.g., What was he 
wearing?) result in more accurate eyewitness evidence than closed questions (e.g., Did he 
have a hat on?), researchers and practitioners alike have acknowledged that police 
investigators find it difficult to prioritise open questioning during investigative interviews 
(Powell, 2001; Sternberg et al. 2001; Warren et al., 1999; Wise et al., 2011). To date, 
however, the widespread assumption that “open questions are simply harder to generate” has 
not been tested empirically. Here, we explicitly examined the ease with which people can 
generate open and closed questions, and how prior knowledge might influence this ability. 
Participants in the present study were given two minutes to generate either open or closed 
questions for a hypothetical witness to a crime. Half of the participants were provided with 
information about the crime that had ostensibly been provided by other witnesses; remaining 
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participants were provided with no such information. We calculated both the number of 
questions correctly generated and the number of errors made. 
First, we expected that participants asked to generate open questions would generate 
fewer questions and make more errors than those asked to generate closed questions. Second, 
we predicted exposure to prior information would reduce participants’ ability to generate 
open—but not closed—questions. Finally, we predicted that the closed questions generated—
either correctly or incorrectly—by those exposed to prior information would be more likely 
to contain the prior information topics than those generated by those in the naïve condition, 
and to build on that information rather than simply confirming it. Our main findings are 
discussed below.  
Number of Questions Correctly and Incorrectly Generated 
As predicted, participants generated fewer open questions than closed questions. 
Participants asked to generate open questions also made more errors than those asked to 
generate closed questions. These findings are congruent with the widespread assumption that 
open questions are harder to generate than closed questions, and also align with theory. 
Everyday conversations in English-speaking countries typically consist of predominantly 
specific or closed questioning styles (Eades, 1996). Proactive interference theory predicts that 
this habit would interfere with participants’ ability to restrict their questions to those that are 
open in format (Hay & Jacoby, 1996).  
 Another—not mutually exclusive—explanation for the observed difficulty in 
generating open questions is confirmation bias. Confirmation bias refers to people’s tendency 
to seek, perceive, interpret and remember information in a way that verifies pre-existing 
beliefs and expectations (Nickerson, 1998). We predicted that, if confirmation bias does play 
a role in the challenge of asking open questions, then providing participants with prior 
information about the crime should make generating open questions even more difficult.  
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As expected, prior information did not influence the number of closed questions 
generated. However, when asked to generate open questions, participants in the informed 
condition generated fewer questions than those participants in the naïve condition. That is, 
being exposed to prior information appeared to make open questions harder to generate. This 
could occur because informed participants developed an expectation about what happened 
during the crime, and became biased to confirm this expectation—something that is more 
easily achieved with closed questions.  
In terms of errors, as predicted, participants in the open condition made more errors 
(accidentally asking closed questions when they had been asked to generate open questions) 
than participants in the closed condition (accidentally asking open questions when they had 
been asked to generate closed questions). Contrary to our expectations, however, exposure to 
prior information did not influence the number of errors made, in either question condition. 
We note, however, that our error coding scheme was highly conservative, in that we only 
measured instances in which participants verbalised an entire question of the wrong type. 
That is, if a participant simply began to make an error (e.g., “Was he wearing—”) before 
asking a different question, this utterance would not be coded as an error. Furthermore, we 
could of course only code the questions that participants verbalised. That is, we could not 
detect situations in which participants thought of a question that would be coded as an error, 
but identified it before saying it aloud. It is likely that some participants could detect and 
inhibit an error response earlier than others, and therefore make no measurable errors 
(Fiehler, Ullsperger, & von Cramon, 2004; Norman & Shallice, 1986). The noise created by 
these factors could have also contributed to the lack of statistical significance that was 
observed.  
While previous research has not specifically examined the respective difficulty 
generating open versus closed questions for eyewitnesses—or used the particular paradigm 
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employed in the current study—the present findings are consistent with the wider literature 
on interviewing. For example, police officers have reported finding asking open questions to 
be particularly difficult (Wright and Powell, 2006) and research has repeatedly demonstrated 
that officers tend to ask far more closed questions than open questions in their interviews 
(Fisher et al., 1987)—even after receiving training in best practice interviewing (Powell, 
2001; Sternberg et al. 2001; Wise et al., 2011). Powell (2001), for example, found that after 
comprehensive training, still less than 25% of reported information was elicited via open 
questions—three times less than the recommended percentage. Sternberg et al. (2001) 
obtained similar concerning findings, with trained interviewers eliciting 40% of information 
via suggestive questions, which investigators are explicitly instructed to avoid. Indeed, even 
an understanding of the rationale behind asking open questions does not appear to 
meaningfully increase officers’ ability to do so (Warren et al.,1999).  
Confirmation bias has already been identified as a major problem within police 
investigations (Dror et al, 2006; NAS, 2009). Investigators tend to seek evidence from 
witnesses that will confirm their hypothesis (Toglia et al., 2007), which typically involves 
asking hypothesis-consistent questions, that tend to elicit hypothesis-consistent answers, 
thereby strengthening the bias (Zuckerman et al., 1995). Previous studies examining police 
interviewing of suspects has demonstrated that confirmation bias can exert a strong influence 
on the questions that an investigator asks, in turn influencing the interviewee’s responses 
(Hill et al., 2008; Kassin et al., 2003). 
Question Content  
Further support for a confirmation bias explanation was obtained when we measured 
how prior information influenced question generation, by examining the content of the closed 
questions generated. First, we coded correctly and incorrectly generated closed questions 
according to whether or not their content related to the prior information topics. By 
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comparing question content with that generated by participants in the naïve condition, we 
were able to confirm that the themes that came through from the prior information in the 
generated questions were not simply topics that participants would have likely asked about 
anyway (i.e., violence). This was not the case: participants in the prior information condition 
were more likely to ask questions (both correctly and incorrectly) related to that information 
(e.g., did the male drop a cell phone?), while correspondingly generating fewer questions 
pertaining to topics not discussed in the prior information (e.g., have you spoken to anybody 
else about what you saw?).  
Once we knew that the prior information was informing the questions that were 
generated, we looked at how the information was being used. We did this because it was 
possible that the provided information could have simply served as a convenient list of topics 
to cover, thereby acting as a prompt rather than creating a belief about what happened. Again, 
the findings aligned with our expectations: although participants in both conditions were 
more likely to ask confirmatory questions than elaborative questions overall, informed 
participants were more likely than naïve participants to—both correctly and incorrectly—
generate closed questions that assumed the prior information.   
In summary, our findings suggest that not only do people find it easier to generate 
closed questions than open questions, but that the prior information an individual has about 
the event in question directly influences the content of the closed questions that they 
generate. It is likely, then, that prior information creates a belief about how an event 
unfolded, which people use to formulate their questions.  
Limitations and Future Research  
As with any laboratory study of a real world phenomenon, our experiment has some 
limitations. The main issue pertains to the ecological validity. Perhaps the most obvious 
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limitation is that our participants were not police investigators. We therefore need to consider 
to what extent our findings can be extrapolated and applied to real world situations.  
The general consensus in the literature is that, when it comes to fact-finding in a 
forensic setting, the differences between professionals and laypeople are relatively minor 
(Eisenberg et al., 2005; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Rassin, Eerland, & Kuijpers, 2010). Of 
particular relevance are two studies conducted by Ask and Granhag (2005) and Rassin 
(2010). Both studies examined confirmation bias in the forensic investigative setting using 
groups of police officers and university students as participants, then compared performance 
across groups. Both studies found that police officers and university students alike made 
judgements that conformed to their prior expectations, or to the hypothesis that was initially 
presented to them. Interestingly, both Ask and Granhag (2005) and Rassin (2010) found that 
the professional participant group were even more blind to alternative hypotheses than the 
student participants. These findings suggest that the cognitive processes involved for police 
officers are similar to that of university students. Therefore, if our study was reproduced 
using police officers as participants, the outcomes would likely be similar. In fact, if 
anything, we might expect police officers to be even more influenced by prior information 
than the participants in the present study.  
Another limitation of our paradigm was the artificial simulation style of the mock 
interview that participants conducted. This meant that “James” (the eyewitness) did not 
respond to participants’ questions. The rationale behind this aspect of the paradigm was to 
provide a straightforward way of quantifying question generation without having to allow for 
response length and content. Some participants appeared uncomfortable with this one-way 
style, which clearly lacked a normal conversational flow. It is possible that participants may 
have been able to generate a greater number of questions during a more natural conversation 
style interview, in which the second party’s responses might act as prompts for further 
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inquiry. The proportion of open vs closed questions could also be affected. We know, for 
example, that interviewers ask more closed questions when young children provide fewer 
details in response to open questions (Sternberg, Lamb, Davies, & Westcott, 2001; 
Thoresen, Lonnum, Melinder, Stridbeck, & Magnussen, 2006). It would be beneficial for this 
limitation to be addressed in future research, although any such paradigm would make it very 
difficult to address the timed aspect of the study.  
Implications  
Limitations aside, our findings have implications for how police conduct investigative 
interviews. Despite extensive research having been conducted illustrating the malleable 
nature of memory (Bartlett, 1931; Crombag et al., 1996; Hope et al., 2008;  Lacey & Stark, 
2013; Leippe, 1980; Lindsay, 2008; Loftus, 2005; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Morgan et al., 
2013; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Sharman et al., 2005; Tukey & Brewer, 2003; Wagoner, 
2017; Yuille, 1980), the impact that questioning can have on memory (Belli, 1989; Ceci et 
al., 1987; Loftus 1975; Loftus 1979; Loftus et al., 1978; Loftus et al., 1989; Manning & 
Loftus, 1996; Okado & Stark 2005; Porter et al., 1999; Tversky & Tuchinn 1989; Wagenaar 
& Boer, 1987; Wright et al., 2015), and the resulting comprehensive police investigative 
protocols and training programmes that were developed in accordance with this evidence 
base (Fisher & Schreiber 2007; Powell et al., 2005; Sternberg et al., 2001; Wells et al., 2000), 
evidence shows that police investigators are still failing to ask open questions appropriately 
(Sternberg et al., 2001; Warren et al., 1999; Wilson & Powell, 2001; Wise et al., 2011). 
These findings have led to the argument that the current approach to training police 
investigators is not as effective as was anticipated (Wise et al., 2011).  
How do our findings inform this issue? In the past, a strong emphasis has been placed 
on trainees receiving feedback on their questioning style, with this evaluation continuing into 
the workforce (Myklebust & Bjørklund, 2006; Wright & Powell, 2006). Our findings, 
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however, suggest that the influence of prior expectations on questioning style is a factor that 
warrants attention, because it appears to exacerbate the difficulty of asking open questions.   
 One possibility for addressing this issue is to make police investigators more aware of 
cognitive biases, and how these might affect their questioning. Critically, however, these 
types of biases do not tend to disappear when an individual is aware of them. For instance, 
people tend to believe that biases only apply to other people (the bias blind spot; (Pronin, 
Lin, & Ross, 2002: Scopelliti, 2015). Furthermore, even when individuals accept that they 
might be vulnerable to bias, such biases are not under conscious control (McPherson Frantz, 
2006; Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002). Even if they were, correcting for a bias requires 
us to know not only the direction of the bias, but also its size. In fact, in attempting to correct 
for bias, people sometimes introduce an entirely new one (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).  
A more promising approach, then, could be to put systems in place that limit the 
amount of information an investigator is exposed to prior to an investigative interview. That 
is, instead of attempting to train investigators to not be influenced by their expectations, it 
could be more effective simply to stop those expectations from forming in the first place.  A 
substantial body of research has investigated implementing such procedures in the field of 
forensic sciences. Examples of these procedures include evidence line-ups, where, instead of 
comparing one suspected piece of evidence with one piece of evidence from the crime scene, 
the examiner is presented with multiple “suspect” samples (Miller, 1987; Saks et al., 2003); 
and sequential unmasking, involving an initial examination of the evidence in isolation, prior 
to being exposed to any reference material (Dror et al., 2011; NIST, 2012). Obviously, these 
approaches are better suited to visible forms of evidence, such as bitemark or fingerprint 
analysis; they do not easily apply to an interview setting. However, the concept of 
minimising bias by managing the information that an investigator is exposed to is certainly 
applicable. A forensic procedure that is more relevant in an interview setting is blind testing, 
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which involves the examiner conducting their analysis without being exposed to nonessential 
information (see Found & Ganas, 2013; Kerkhoff et al., 2015; Mattijssen et al., 2016).  
 There are, however, some obstacles associated with trying to limit a police 
investigator’s knowledge of a case. According to best-practice interview guidelines, 
investigators should review all available case information during pre-interview preparations, 
as this is thought to maximise interviewer efficiency and effective witness participation (US 
National Institute of Justice, 1999). Reviewing case information prior to conducting an 
interview can foster rapport building, enhance comprehension of provided witness responses, 
and assist in bringing up difficult topics such as abuse (Poole & Lamb, 1998). Essentially, 
while blind interviewing could have benefits in terms of question format, it could also have 
drawbacks.  
 Implementing procedures that reduce the amount of contextual information 
investigators are exposed to would also require considerable additional resources from police 
organisations, which are usually stretched to their limit. The feasibility of having a different 
investigator interviewing each eyewitness would be low under optimal conditions, let alone 
in challenging circumstances, such as a large investigation involving many witnesses, time-
sensitive enquiries, or investigations being conducted in small communities.  
A further complicating factor is that, even without being explicitly provided with 
information pertaining to a specific case, police investigators are still aware of what 
information needs to be proven in order for charges to be laid. For example, an offender who 
threatens to kill a victim will face different charges to one who does not. This knowledge 
could act in a similar way to case-specific contextual information in terms of influencing 
question generation (e.g., increasing the likelihood of asking “Did he threaten to kill you?”). 
If that were the case, then reducing the amount of contextual information an investigator is 
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exposed to would be less effective, and could also be ineffective. This empirical question 
warrants further investigation.  
Beyond the Forensic Context  
The implications of our findings are not limited to police; there are many other 
professions that promote the use of open questioning as best practice, yet have issues with 
implementation. For example, open question use is important across health care professions 
(Grover, 2005; Makoul, 2001; Williams, Weinman, & Dale, 1998). Disciplines of particular 
focus in the literature include nutritionists and dieticians (AbuSabha, 2013), and professionals 
working in palliative care and hospice (Lo, Quill, & Tulsky, 1999; Meier, 2014). It is also 
recommended that, in an effective clinical interview, clinical psychologists should ask twice 
as many open questions as closed questions (Miller & Rollnick, 2002), although this is not 
often seen in practice (Harwood & Eyberg, 2004).  
 Failing to ask open questions can mean that health care professionals fail to glean the 
primary reason that a patient is seeking care. Beckham and Frankel (1984), for example, 
found that in 69% of recorded doctor visits, the physician interrupted the patient during their 
opening statement and asked directive questions narrowing in on a specific concern. An open 
questioning style is also important for building rapport with patients, and failure to use open 
questions can create the appearance of judgement. Patients can be uncooperative and 
disengage from treatment if they feel they are being told what to do. Therefore, in order to 
facilitate change in an individual, practitioners need ask the right type of questions 
(Manchester, 2012).  
 Education is also a field in which open questions are recommended. Inquiry-based 
learning—which promotes students as active agents in their learning—stresses the 
importance of asking open questions, allowing students the opportunity to blend new 
knowledge into their existing knowledge (National Research Council, 2000). However, 
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despite understanding the importance of this approach and undergoing training, teachers 
frequently struggle to utilise open questions in the classroom (Foss & Kleinsasser, 1996; 
Inoue & Buczynski, 2011).  
Conclusion  
When we consider that eyewitness evidence is one of the most influential forms of 
evidence in the courtroom (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), and that eyewitness error is the main 
cause of wrongful conviction (Innocence Project, 2017), it is paramount that we collect 
eyewitness evidence in a way that best preserves accuracy. The present study is the first to 
empirically examine the widely-believed assumption that asking open questions is ‘harder’ 
than asking closed questions, as well as offering some tentative insight as to why this is. Our 
findings that confirmation bias likely plays a key role in difficulty associated with generating 
open questions could guide future research and eventually inform the development of police 
protocols. In addition to being relevant across a wide range of professions, the findings from 
the present study could have flow-on effects for reducing the chances of miscarriages of 
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RESEARCH WITHIN FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you.  If 
you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for 
considering our request.   
 
What is the aim of the project? 
 
We are interested in how adults recall and describe memorable events from their childhood 
(e.g., a time when they received an injury). We are also interested in how easily adults are 
able to generate different kinds of questions. This project is being undertaken as part of the 
requirements for three PhDs in Psychology (those of Jacob Ingram, Andrew Mills, and 
Kimberley Wake) and one Masters in Psychology (that of Ellen Warhurst). 
 
What types of participants are being sought? 
 
We are recruiting adult participants, aged 18 years or above, via the Department of 
Psychology’s Research Participation website. Please note: Participants MUST NOT have 
previously signed up for the experiments “Studies within Forensic Psychology” or “Witness 
Recall and Other Burning Questions”. 
 
Participants will receive reimbursement at the completion of the experiment.  
 
What will participants be asked to do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in TWO 
SESSIONS lasting approximately 1 hour each. Both sessions will involve being interviewed 
by an experienced postgraduate researcher. During the first session, you will complete 
several tasks, including: (a) reading a vignette and answering some questions about it; (b) 
being interviewed about a significant event from your childhood (e.g., a time when you 
received an injury that resulted in a physical scar) in as much detail as you can; and (c) 
watching two short film clips and participating in some brief related tasks.  
 
The second session will take place ONE WEEK after the first session, at the same time and 
on the same day of the week. During this session, you will participate in several tasks related 
to the first session, as well as being asked to generating some questions, and complete a 
survey on a computer. 
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IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: The vignette used in session one of this experiment 
describes an alleged sexual assault. Some people may find this distressing or upsetting. 
Please do not take part in this experiment if you think this may apply to you. 
 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage 
to yourself. 
 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
The information provided by you in the tasks with the experimenter will be audio-recorded, 
transcribed, and coded. Your responses to the computer surveys will be recorded on the 
computer and analysed. The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only 
those directly involved in the project will be able to gain access to it.  Data obtained as a 
result of the research will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage.  Any personal 
information held on the participants (e.g. contact details) will be destroyed at the completion 
of the research even though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for 
much longer or possibly indefinitely.  The results of the project may be published and will be 
available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will 
be made to preserve your anonymity. 
Can participants change their mind and withdraw from the project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself. 
 
What if participants have any questions? 
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concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago 
Human Ethics Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph. 03 479-
8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be 
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I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All 
of my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage. 
I know that: - 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information (e.g., audio-files) will be destroyed at the conclusion of 
the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in 
secure storage for at least five years;  
 
4.  As a part of this study, I will be exposed to a vignette detailing an alleged sexual assault. 
I am satisfied that this will not cause me distress; 
 
5.  Upon completion of the second session, I will be reimbursed $30 for my time; 
 
6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my 
anonymity.   
 









(Printed name)               (Date of birth) 
 
Gender (optional): ............................. 
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Appendix C 
Question Types Training Exercise 
 
[The following definitions and examples were presented] 
 
For the purposes of this experiment, we will focus on two types of questions: 
1) Closed Questions 
2) Open Questions 
 
Closed Questions are: 
- Yes/No Questions (e.g., "Have you been to Mexico?") 
- Forced-choice Questions (e.g., "Is the lecture in Castle 1 or Castle 2?") 
 
In closed questions, the options for responding are very restricted and very clear from the 
question (e.g., "Yes"; "No"; "Castle 1"; "Castle 2") 
- Closed questions elicit fixed responses. 
- The person responding has very little flexibility in their responses. 
 
Closed question examples: 
- Was it dark or light outside?  
- Did you finish your dinner?  
- Is your car red or blue?  
- Are you allergic to peanuts?  
- Do you prefer ice cream or yogurt?  
- Do you have a brother?  
 
Open questions are: 
- ‘Wh-’ or ‘How’ questions (e.g., “When did you learn to drive?)  
- ‘Tell’ questions (e.g., “Tell me all about your family”)  
- ‘Describe’ questions (e.g., “Describe your house”)  
 
In open questions, the options for responding are far more broad, and not contained in the 
question. 
- Open questions elicit detailed responses.  
- The person responding has more flexibility in their responses. 
 
Open question examples: 
- Tell me what sky diving was like.  
- How did you and your best friend meet?  
- What is your favourite memory from childhood?  
- Describe how to get to Tunnel Beach.  
- When did you move to Dunedin?  
- Who are you going to the concert with? 
 
Now it's your turn... 
Next, you will be shown some questions.  
Your job is to indicate whether they are closed or open questions. 
Ready? 
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[The following questions were presented in randomised order, the correct answer is specified 
in brackets] 
 
1. Do you have a dog? (Closed) 
2. Tell me about your holiday in Fiji? (Open) 
3. What did you do over summer? (Open) 
4. Is your phone an iPhone or an Android? (Closed) 
5. Have you been to the library today? (Closed) 
6. How do you make French toast? (Open) 
7. Are you religious? (Closed) 
8. Where is the best museum in the world? (Open) 
9. Describe your room (Open) 
10. Do you like cooking? (Closed) 
11. Why do you love sports? (Open) 
12. Would you like a medium or large coffee? (Closed) 
13. Have you seen all of the Harry Potter movies? (Closed) 
14. Are you from New Zealand or overseas? (Closed) 
15. Tell me about global politics  (Open) 
16. What do you think you'll do when you finish university? (Open) 
17. Do you like skiing? (Closed) 
18. Describe a tiger (Open) 
19. Do you prefer sweet or savoury foods? (Closed) 



















































- Questions transcribed verbatim, however: 
o Start counting words from when the start of question is decided and 
holistically makes sense. Exclude repetitive pre-question words (e.g., Did 
you…. What did you do?) 
o Include repetitive or clarifying words WITHIN question – otherwise exclusion 
will be too subjective (e.g., What did the [participants, not the participants 
the] people in the altercation look like) 
- Cut out ‘and’ when sentences/questions are separated by a pause. Count as two 
different questions 
Two-minute time limit: 
- If the question is finished after ‘stop’ is said, see whether it contains enough 
information to form a complete thought before ‘stop’ – if so, count it. If not, do not 
count it. 
Grammar: 
- I have been lenient with grammar, such as if they use the wrong tense or one wrong 
word (e.g., Did you SAW the male hit the female). However, if the question does not 
make sense at all do not count it. Exclude participant if language is too poor. 
Highlighting ink: 
- Highlight in green if they self-correct (e.g., they incorrectly say a closed question and 
then say it was closed/a mistake). You still count these as errors but we may look at 
how many people explicitly realised they were making errors. 
- Highlight red if you are unsure how to classify a question. 
Highlighting cell background: 
- Highlight yellow if unable to be used due to poor English language or a procedural 
error (e.g., wrong script used, non-standardised script). 
Cultural politeness: 
- Many people put ‘could/can you’ before they say describe or ask open questions. 
Count this as open (as per Shepherd, 2007) 
- DO NOT count it as open if they say: 
o Do you remember.. 
o Can you tell me if.. 
o Can you explain if there.. 
o Can you remember.. 
Conditional Questions (‘If x…) 
- Some are tricky and can be two types of questions. Do not count the conditional if the 
subsequent part of the question is closed. Just write the question. Count as open and 
closed when there are two different parts of the question. For example: 
o If there were, did you see any of them approach the female afterwards? 
o → Closed: Did you see any of them approach the female afterwards? 
o Can you describe if there were any injuries and what they were? 
o →  Closed: Can you describe if there were any injuries? 
o → Open: [can you describe] What they were? 
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Multiple questions in one question: 
- Split them into open and closed parts if appropriate and count each. 
o For example: Did you ask the female how she was doing and what did she say 
o → Closed: Did you ask the female how she was doing? 
o → Open: What did she say? 
- If they ask a question with many parts linked with ‘and’, just count as one. The 
question needs to be able to be a ‘stand-alone’ question for it to be counted separately 
o Describe to me what the male looked like and what the female looked like and 
how he approached her? → is counted as one question 
o What did the male look like and what did the female look like and how did he 
approach her?  → three questions 
- It is coded as one question if they say it as one utterance and use ‘or’ as a joining 
word. You would count this as two words if the joining word is ‘and’ (and the two 
questions are different). 
o For example: Did you happen to video any evidence or did you manage to 
video any of the altercation occurring when it occurred? 
Repetition: 
- If repetition is correct (i.e.., in correct question category), do not count as an extra 
question or error. 
- If repetition is incorrect ( i.e., an error question), count as errors 
o However, if repetition of same/similar question happens in the same utterance 
(e.g., clarification) count as one error/question. 
Invalid criteria: 
- Wrong script read 
- Unstandardized script 
- Unstandardized and influential prompts/information given 
- Extremely Poor language 
- If they think James is the male involved in altercation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
